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Abstract
From fact-checking chatbots to community-maintained misinformation databases, Taiwan has emerged as a critical case-
study for citizen participation in politics online. Due to Taiwan’s geopolitical history with China, the recent 2020 Taiwanese
Presidential Election brought fierce levels of online engagement led by citizens from both sides of the strait. In this arti-
cle, we study misinformation and digital participation on three platforms, namely Line, Twitter, and Taiwan’s Professional
Technology Temple (PTT, Taiwan’s equivalent of Reddit). Each of these platforms presents a different facet of the elec-
tions. Results reveal that the greatest level of disagreement occurs in discussion about incumbent president Tsai. Chinese
users demonstrate emergent coordination and selective discussion around topics like China, Hong Kong, and President Tsai,
whereas topics like Covid-19 are avoided. We discover an imbalance of the political presence of Tsai on Twitter, which sug-
gests partisan practices in disinformation regulation. The cases of Taiwan and China point toward a growing trend where
regular citizens, enabled by new media, can both exacerbate and hinder the flow of misinformation. The study highlights
an overlooked aspect of misinformation studies, beyond the veracity of information itself, that is the clash of ideologies,
practices, and cultural history that matter to democratic ideals.
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1. Introduction
Taiwan is one of the freest regions in Asia from a socio-
political standpoint, and yet it receives some of the high-
est concentrations of online disinformation, due to its
geo-political history with China (Monaco, 2017). With
waning trust in the traditional media over the course
of recent years (Hu, 2017), Taiwan has turned to grass-
roots cyber-interventions, spearheaded by its commu-
nity of civic ‘hacktivists’ (Fan et al., 2019; Rowen, 2015).
The recent 2020 Taiwanese Presidential Election has thus
presented a fierce battleground that re-examines demo-
cratic values.
Citizen participation in support of and detrimen-
tal to democratic ideals is not a new phenomenon.
In Dark Participation, Quandt contrasted the utopian
vision and dark realities of citizen news making (Quandt,
2018). Benight participation involves citizen-journalists
who selflessly take part in democratic deliberation. Dark
participation, in contrast, describes negative contribu-
tions to news production. This includes “trolling,” piggy-
backing off untruths, and the dissemination of disinfor-
mation. Recent studies have linked this with the grow-
ing populism in the West, a political trend also observed
in Taiwan. Han Kuo-Yu, the presidential candidate run-
ning against the incumbent President Tsai, is frequently
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compared to US President Trump in both his rise as a
businessman-turned-politician and his use of politicized
rhetoric (Cole, 2019).
Two years after dark participation has been first char-
acterized, the political media ecosystem has evolved.
The case of Taiwan encapsulates two gray areas in
this light–dark dichotomy. First, both the diffusion
and defense against misinformation are citizen-driven.
Disinformation has been well-documented to arises
from nationalized citizens from China (Yang, Chen, Shih,
Bardzell, & Bardzell, 2017), instead of government-
sponsored campaigns. Rather than light and dark partici-
pation as characterized by Quandt, the elections charac-
terize the clash of divergent political ideologies rooted in
seven decades of history.
Second, the use of digital tools to fight disinforma-
tion is a double-edged sword. The Anti-infiltration Act,
passed two weeks prior to the elections, caused signifi-
cant controversy, with its critics worrying it was too par-
tisan. The former head of the National Communication
Commission, who allegedly resigned over disagreements
for this act, stated that although “disinformation is the
enemy of an open and democratic society…they [might]
lose that open society by fighting against it” (Aspinwall,
2020a). The use of technology to promote certain polit-
ical discourses against foreign interference may appear
positive, while simultaneously diminishing the vibrancy
of domestic discourse.
1.1. Research Questions and Contributions
This article presents the case study of the 2020
Taiwanese Presidential Election, told through the lens
of three widely adopted platforms: Line, Twitter, and
Taiwan’s Professional Technology Temple (PTT, Taiwan’s
equivalent of Reddit). Each platform reveals a unique
dimension to the election’s discourse. We draw primar-
ily from two theoretical framings. First, we postulate
the influx of disinformation as a threat to three demo-
cratic normative goods: self-determination, account-
able representation, and public deliberation (Tenove,
2020). Second, we consider the modal actors of media
regulation, specifically from political parties to grass-
roots volunteers.
As wewill see in Section 2, disinformation has always
played a part in Taiwanese elections. A walk through
history shows interference techniques morphing from
direct displays of military power to subtle digital manipu-
lation efforts. However, pinpointing the sources of mis-
information is a difficult task, which depends on each
platform’s accessibility. Instead, we focus on understand-
ing the discourse topics, the users involved, and how
they engage in discussion over these democratic, norma-
tive goods. Our research questions and hypotheses are
as follows:
RQ1: How do discourse, user behavior, and political
intent vary across and within platforms?
• H1a: Twitter will contain higher levels of for-
eign users, consistent with known percentages
of platform usage.
RQ2: On Twitter, do we observe instances of geopolit-
ical divisions and transnational solidarity?
• H2a: High levels of transnational support exist
between Taiwan and Hong Kong.
• H2b: Therewill be higher levels of bot-like behav-
ior from mainland Chinese users.
RQ3: Which democratic normative goods appear vul-
nerable to misinformation?
• H3: Posts about Tsai, and hence engagement
with issues of accountable representation, will
produce high levels of disagreement from
Chinese users and rural areas.
RQ4: What is the role of the traditional media in
spreading disinformation?
• H4: A sizable proportion of news articleswill con-
tainmisinformation, consistent with the distrust
in the traditional media.
By answering these questions, we aim to contribute crit-
ical literature about the next phase of the light and
dark debate, specifically how citizens respond collec-
tively to address dark participation. Like other Asian
countries, Taiwan’s social media ecosystem is domi-
nated by chatroom-based communication, a distinction
from the West. As misinformation spreads behind these
closeddoors, the power of government policies is limited.
Disinformation regulation in these cases becomes less a
matter of policy, and more a community norm, in line
with recently proposed theoretical frameworks (Starbird,
Arif, & Wilson, 2019). Taiwan’s case study enables us
to understand communal commitments to maintain the
quality of public deliberation.
2. Background
2.1. The 2020 Taiwanese Elections: The Political
Backdrop
In 1949, the conflict between Taiwan and China began.
Facing defeat by the communist party, General Chiang
Kai-Shek retreated to the island, and Taiwan has been
a “de facto independent nation” (Monaco, 2017) ever
since. Over the last four decades, a significant divide
between the two countries has developed, in language,
culture, and governance. According to the Freedom
House in 2019, only Japan has a higher score for politi-
cal freedom than Taiwan in Asia (Freedom House, 2019).
Politically, two dominant parties have emerged:
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• Democratic Progressive Party (DPP): The DPP is
the nationalist and more liberal-leaning party
in Taiwan. They are traditionally seen as more
independence-leaning or holding a stronger sense
of Taiwanese national identity.
• Kuo Ming Tang (KMT): The KMT is also a national-
ist and liberal political party in Taiwan. They ruled
the Republic of China between 1928 to 2000, after
retreating to Taiwan in 1949. They traditionally
advocate for closer economic ties with China.
These two parties provided the primary candidates dur-
ing prior elections, and the 2020 electionswere no excep-
tion. President Tsai Ing-wen from the DPP sought to
defend her presidency, whereas Han Kuo-Yu was the
opposing candidate nominated by the KMT. Tsai was, for
the most part, an institutional candidate. She has law
degrees from both Cornell and the London School of
Economics and began her political career in independent
governmental positions; she served as a trade negotia-
tor for the WTO on behalf of President Lee Teng-hui.
She joined the DPP in 2004 and was elected into leader-
ship in 2008 as the first woman chairing a political party.
She was defeated by Ma Ying-jeou in her first presiden-
tial run of 2012 and, in her second bid in 2016, she won
by a landslide (Hsiao, 2016).
A year prior to the election Tsai was projected to
lose to Han, due to a few factors. First, wage stag-
nation, public pension reform, and same-sex marriage
led to general discontent toward her presidency. As a
result, she suffered an astounding defeat during the 2018
local elections. However, the Hong Kong Anti-extradition
Bill Protests triggered a change in sentiment across the
island. After Chairman Xi Jinping gave a hardliner speech
regarding the one-China policy, polls showed dramatic
improvement to Tsai’s campaign (Hsiao, 2019).
Han was different from previous candidates due to
his unconventional background and rapid rise in polit-
ical power. Starting a political career from unknown
origins, he became the mayor of the third-largest city
in Taiwan, Kaohsiung. No one expected him to win.
Kaohsiung has been the DPP stronghold for more than
20 years, and the KMT chairman Wu Den-yih sent Han
to contest Kaohsiung with no expectations of victory
(Jansen, 2019). Yet, he won in a landslide, owing to a
surge of popular support themedia called the ‘Hanwave.’
His slogan was simple—Get Rich! His iconic hairless head
earned him the nickname ‘the Bald Guy.’ Within six
months of his election, he declared his run for presidency
(Reichenbach, 2020).
Importantly, the Han Wave bears many similarities
to US President Trump’s Make America Great Again
movement (Cole, 2019). As the Han Wave swept across
the island, he accrued a large group of dedicated
‘Han fans’ estimated at 1,2 million. He appealed to
rural voters, employed economy-focused brash rhetoric,
and most critically, he entertained. Similar to the way
the media latched onto President Trump’s tweets, Han
appeared frequently on social media, the news, and in
discourse led by supporters from China. It was against
this backdrop—a dark horse candidate who had flipped
the DPP’smost supported city—that the 2020 Taiwanese
Election was held.
2.2. Taiwan’s History of Foreign Interference
Foreign interference from China is intimately tied with
Taiwan’s elections, first taking form as military exer-
cises. Before Taiwan’s first presidential election in 1996,
the People’s Liberation Army fired missiles in the water
around the island, in a show of intimidation. In the
form of information warfare, radio stations and large
speakers project sound across the strait to influence
the elections.
In recent years, interference from China has taken a
different form. Chinese trolling has often been described
as decentralized, arising from netizens (Internet citizens).
Diba, a sizable group of Chinese nationalists is known
to overcome China’s Great Firewall to troll Taiwanese
political leadership (Yang et al., 2017). Interestingly, Diba
violates the People’s Republic of China’s legal norms for
spreading pro-People’s Republic of China messages on
the Internet, in amanner ironically similar tomovements
on self-determination.
To contextualize what misinformation looks like in
Taiwan, we present two recent cases. The first was after
Typhoon Jebi hit Japan and knocked out Osaka’s Kansai
International Airport, a report from PTT said China had
evacuated Chinese nationals from the airport. The report
then said that if Taiwan citizens identified themselves as
Chinese they would also be evacuated. Taiwan’s Foreign
Ministry Representative Su Chii-cheng, following waves
of criticism that he failed to protect Taiwanese citizens
during this natural disaster, committed suicide. After
his death, it was revealed that the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) was also unable to evacuate Chinese citi-
zens, and the original message, shared repeatedly online
and amplified by legacy media outlets, was fabricated.
The message was eventually traced back to Weibo
(China’s main microblogging site). The second case was
during the 2018 mid-term elections, a widespread ghost
island meme spread across social media, stoking fear of
opportunity loss, economic stagnation, and government
corruption. The term first arose on PTT, now used as self-
deprecating criticism about Taiwan, but was successfully
used by Chinese users to agitate feelings of emptiness
and pessimism toward Taiwan’s economic future.
While the source of false news may arise from main-
land China, its amplification is often a direct result of
Taiwan’s traditional media. In these cases, although the
CCP helped stoke fears by supporting these stories, the
primary spread arose from sensational-oriented journal-
ism practices in Taiwan itself.
Prior theories on the organization of disinforma-
tion campaigns show the modal actors of authori-
tarian regimes are the central governments, whereas
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in democracies this is taken up by political parties
(Bradshaw & Howard, 2018). Monaco (2017) delineates
propaganda in Taiwan in two primary forms: 1) Internal
campaigns—domestic political propaganda on social
issues, usually between these two parties, where the
modal actors are the political parties; 2) cross-strait
campaigns—propaganda that originates from the main-
land to promote unification discourse, where the modal
actors are the central government (CCP).
As modal actors of regulation are also political par-
ties, attempts to stymie disinformation may become
internal campaigns of propaganda. In other words, the
modal actor for defending against foreign disinformation
may become the perpetrator domestically. Additionally,
the case of Diba contradicts this framework, as it is not
centralized and organized, but decentralized and spon-
taneous. To understand this gray area in greater depth,
we reviewTaiwan’s regulation ofmedia platforms against
misinformation.
2.3. The 2020 Elections: Working Together with Social
Media Companies
On December 31, 2019, a highly controversial Anti-
Infiltration Act was passed in the Legislative Yuan.
The law regulated the influence of entities deemed
foreign hostile forces in Taiwan (Aspinwall, 2020b).
Containing 12 articles, it barred people from accepting
money or acting on foreign instruction. Penalties were
severe: violations include fines up to $10 million NTD
($333,167 USD) and five years in prison.
The passage of the law came with criticism. The KMT
criticizing the incumbent DPP party for forcing it through
legislation. As mentioned prior, the former director of
the National Communications Commission believed it
to negatively impact domestic free speech. However,
although the nature and substance of misinformation
were debated, both parties agreed foreign interference
should be regulated on social media.
Information travels fast as Taiwan is one of the
most technologically integrated countries, with an 86%
Internet penetration rate and 78.8% smartphone pene-
tration rate (Thomala, 2020). Moreover, around 60% of
Taiwanese use social media to source news, particularly
for civic and political engagement (Chen, Chan, & Lee,
2016). Table 1 shows the overall usage rates for platforms
in Taiwan.
Leading up to the elections, Facebook and Line
came under scrutiny for the different ways they func-
tion. Facebook is a more open, profile-based social net-
work. Line is a chatroomservice, thereforemore ‘private.’
Dr. Puma Shen, a keymember of themisinformation task-
force, categorized misinformation acting in three modal-
ities (Hioe, 2020a):
1. Online and digital: On public social media plat-
forms like Facebook.
2. Offline and digital: Apps such as Line disseminating
messages directly from user to user.
3. Offline and physical: Local gangs, temples, and
village leaders have for a long time taken illicit
payments. As an example, many sources of pay-
ment were through off-shore, Chinese–Malaysian
companies.
The importance of Facebook became apparent in the
2014 elections for the Taipei mayor. Ko Wen-ze, a physi-
cian with slight Asperger’s, became the first alternative
candidate to become elected mayor. As a believer in
quantitative analytics, his campaign was driven by an in-
depth analysis of 11–14 million Facebook profiles, in a
country of 23million. In response, Facebook set up a ‘war
room’ to help regulate content (Huang, 2019).
Due to this distrust in the traditional media, Taiwan
has turned to third-party, cyber-solutions to help decide
what sources of news are credible. Since chatrooms in
Line are not available to the public moderation, misin-
formation flourishes. The Cofacts chatbot was created
to counter chatroom-based misinformation (Han, 2018).
Developed by g0v (gov-zero), a grassroots civic hacker
group in Taiwan, users who receive questionable mes-
sages forward them to the Cofacts chatbot. The mes-
sage is then added to a database, fact-checked by editors,
before returned to the user. Future incidents of the same
article are then automatically replied.
Taiwan is not unique in its attempts to fact-check,
since Brexit and the 2016 US Presidential Election
revealed the impact of misinformation. Ahead of the
polls in July 2018, 90 media outlets in Mexico banded
together to fact-check election misinformation, in col-
laborative, journalistic fact-checking (Terceros, 2018).
Singapore has a state-run fact-checker called Factually,
and Indonesia holds weekly misinformation briefings.
However, the entirely citizen-driven approach is unique
to Taiwan, though it exists along-side of governmen-
tal solutions and official resources. This crowd-sourced
approach addresses centralized shortcomings and is con-
sistent with advantages shown by Pennycook and Rand,
particularly in regards to source credibility (Epstein,
Pennycook, & Rand, 2020), quality (Pennycook & Rand,
2019), and publisher credibility (Dias, Pennycook, &
Rand, 2020).
While Line and Facebook are conduits, PTT has
emerged as an important source in Chinese misinforma-
Table 1. Social media platform usage in Taiwan.
Media Platform Facebook Line Messenger WeChat Twitter
Usage Rate 89% 84% 55% 33% 27%
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tion campaigns. Many PTT accounts are auctioned off
Shopee, an auction website used frequently in Taiwan
and Southeast Asia. They have also appeared on Taobao,
China’s auction site, with the most influential accounts
being reportedly sold for $6,500 USD. As with the case
of the Jibe typhoon, many journalists use PPT to source
information, which causes false claims to be repeated via
the traditional media.
2.4. How Disinformation Harms Democracy: Normative
Goods Threatened by Disinformation
Here, we distinguish between misinformation and dis-
information. The primary distinction is postulated upon
intent. Misinformation denotes false information that
is shared, regardless of an intent to mislead (Karlova
& Fisher, 2013). It is generally accepted as a fallible
aspect of human nature, in our propensity to misre-
member, mishear, and share sensational information.
Disinformation denotes false information disseminated
as a hostile act or political subversion. It is the intentional
diffusion of misinformation.
When considering disinformation, there are vague
assertions to how its spread is detrimental to demo-
cratic societies. It is valuable to discuss the specific loci
it damages. Tenove typologies three democratic norma-
tive goods threatened by disinformation that require dif-
ferent policy responses (Tenove, 2020).
Self-determination refers to the ability of a demo-
cratic population to enact collective rules to govern
themselves. Thus, they are primarily addressed through
security policies at the international and domestic lev-
els. This is perhaps most salient to Taiwan’s gover-
nance. However, many contemporary democratic the-
orists maintain foreign influence is beneficial to self-
determination. In a globalized world, the actions of one
state influence another. Thus, policies of disinformation
regulation draw the limit for which foreign actors can
influence domestic policy.
Self-determination and Taiwan’s sovereignty lie at
the center of every election, with this time often emerg-
ing through Hong Kong. Solidarity between Taiwan and
Hong Kong is not new, andmodern support can be traced
to the Sunflowermovement in 2014. The slogan “Today’s
Hong Kong, Tomorrow Taiwan” emerged then, which
showed Hong Kong as a constant measure of what hap-
pens if Taiwan loses its democratic freedom. This projec-
tion goes both ways: Hong Kong often frames Taiwan as
a political utopia and is posed as a “lost historical pos-
sibility” (Hioe, 2020b). As we will see, the Hong Kong
protests play a decisive role in shaping the discourse dur-
ing the elections.
Accountable representation refers directly to the pro-
cedures of elections. In these cases, disinformation chal-
lenges citizen trust in elected representatives (European
Commission, 2018). Classic examples include false claims
as to where and when voting occurs, as demonstrated in
the 2016 US Presidential election (DiResta et al., 2019).
Another example includes false stories targeting specific
candidates. In the 2020 Taiwanese Presidential election,
twomajor stories emerged to discredit Tsai. According to
these sources of false news Tsai faked her college degree
and was a secret homosexual who wanted to corrupt
Taiwanese children. The second false story stated that
Tsai wanted to sell the country out to Japan and the US.
Public deliberation addresses the quality of public
discourse. Rather than addressing actors themselves, as
national security and election policies do, public dis-
course is protected via media regulation. According to
theories of deliberative democracies, critical to well-
informed public decision making requires communica-
tive exchanges among citizens (Habermas, 1996). Here,
disinformation threatens to undermine deliberative sys-
tems by increasing the quantity of false claims, dimin-
ishing engagement and opportunities to engage in pub-
lic discussions.
The measures of our analysis are materializing:
We wish to understand how these three normative
goods emerge during the 2020 Taiwanese Elections.
The same piece of misinformation can simultaneously
act on all three goods. Next, we consider the specifics
of the dataset and methods of our analysis.
3. Methods
3.1. Data
We use three main sources of data—Twitter, PTT, and
Cofacts. First, we scraped Twitter using a keyword list
pertaining to the elections, including the names of the
three primary candidates (Tsai ing-wen, Han Kuo-Yu,
and James Song and their parties). We also tracked
terms about the election broadly, such as Taiwan2020,
ComeHomeAndVote, and TaiwanVote.
As an overview of the dataset, Table 2 shows the
general distribution of tweet languages. Since we have
filtered using Taiwan as a necessary keyword, this data
set is topically bound to discourse about the island.
We observe a high level of Japanese and English tweets,
which reflects the high Twitter usage in the West and
Japan. In Japan, Twitter is used by 45 million monthly
users (35%) and is the highest across all social media
platforms (Yoshida, 2018). In comparison, Facebook
only has 22% penetration (“Kokunai mau 2,800 man-ri
toppa,’’ 2017).
Second, we scraped PTT, often described as the
Reddit of Taiwan. It was founded in 1995 by students
at the National Taiwan University. With more than
1,5 million registered users, up to 150,000 users can be
online during peak hours. Around 500,000 comments are
posted every day. The structure of PTT is similar to that of
Twitter, as users can like and reply to threads. However,
reactions can be positive (推) or negative (虛).
In this article, we scraped 11,116 unique bulletin
posts between November 1, 2019, and January 21, 2020,
filtered on posts relating to the elections. The subset of
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Table 2. Top 10 languages by the number of tweets.











keywords included the three main candidates, and the
words election and vote. For a cleaner subset, we vied to
include only postswho included thesewords in their title.
This totaled to 960,000 individual comments and replies
on the posts, with IP, time, and date.
Third, and most importantly for misinforma-
tion, we analyzed discourse on Line. We use the
Cofacts database—a public, crowd-sourced data set of
misinformation—and we used the four, relevant data
tables listed below:
1. Articles: Specific links, texts, or articles that users
forward.
2. Article replies: A table that aggregates replies to
an article, with a score of 1 or -1, indicating True or
False.
3. Replies: An editor’s reply to an article. There are
four outcomes: a) Misinformation, the article con-
tains potential misinformation or is unverified;
b) opinion, the article contains information that
is an opinion; c) non-rumor, the article is factual;
d) not-an-article, the article does not pertain to
Cofacts.
4. Reply requests: Includes the article ID, but also the
reason why it was included.
Each of these data sources reveals a different aspect
of misinformation during the 2020 Taiwanese Elections.
Twitter shows the coverage of the elections from actors
domestic and abroad. PTT shows the domestic discourse,
and due to its provision of IP, geo-local distribution of
discourse. Cofacts shows the types of posts that arouse
suspicion, including fact-checked labels for whether they
contain misinformation, and opinion, or fact. The pri-
mary form of our analysis consists of time-series and net-
work analysis, with cross-sectional analysis in volume.
4. Results
Figure 1 gives an overview of participation volume across
all three channels. Twitter is shown in blue, PTT in purple,
and Line in green. Immediately, we observe a rise in vol-
ume as we approach the day of the election, January 11,
2020. However, on the day itself, levels depress in PTT
and Line. The levels of Line are also more consistent
throughout and increases after January 20th.
This is likely due to the combination of two reasons.
First, it is against the law in Taiwan to post about the
elections on the day ballots are counted. Since Line is
closely tied to one’s individual account, levels remained
constant. We see a similar dip in PTT, though posts were

































































































Figure 1. Fraction of posts per day on each platform during the collection timeframe.
Media and Communication, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 144–157 149
nature of the platform. This suggests that electoral reg-
ulation was enacted unequally across platforms, and
answers partially RQ1. Second, due to Twitter’s low
usage in Taiwan and higher penetration in Japan and the
West, we observe a spike likely due to foreign coverage.
Next, we consider each of these platforms in detail.
4.1. Twitter
We set to establish what fraction of the discussion on the
Twitter platform is organic versus posted by automated
accounts (a.k.a., bots; Ferrara, Varol, Davis, Menczer,
& Flammini, 2016). We used a state-the-art bot detec-
tion tool designed for Twitter, Botometer (Davis, Varol,
Ferrara, Flammini, & Menczer, 2016), to quantify bots’
prevalence. In line with recent literature (Ferrara, 2020;
Yang et al., 2019), we used the top 10 and bottom 10
percentiles of users to set apart likely human users from
automated accounts, with Botscores of 0.06 and below
for humans and 0.67 and above for bots. This yielded
14,948 human accounts (responsible for 30,365 tweets
and 3.4% of the total tweets) and 14,929 bots (with
34,020 tweets representing 3.9% of the total tweets).
The total number of accounts scored was 141,929 (with
389,851 tweets).
Table 3 shows the differences in tweet types between
humans and bots. Somewhat expectedly, humans post
original tweets almost twice as much, and more quoted
tweets. Bots on the other hand retweet without com-
ment at almost 10% extra propensity. This is consis-
tent with general characteristics of bot behavior (Davis
et al., 2016).
A more pronounced difference can be observed with
the language type. Table 4 shows the distribution of
simplified and traditional Chinese. Simplified Chinese is
used by China and traditional Chinese is used by Taiwan.
We see only 7.4% of Chinese-humans users write in sim-
plified, whereas 92.6% use in traditional Chinese. In con-
trast, for all Chinese-speaking bots, 31.5% use simplified
Chinese, and 68.5% use traditional Chinese. This indi-
cates a much stronger chance that a bot is adopting sim-
plified Chinese. We corroborate this by considering the
location of users. The bottom row shows that most of
the tweets arise from non-local sources, which together
affirms H1. We conclude much of the chatter on Twitter
about Taiwan arises from outside of Taiwan.
The high level of English and Japanese in Table 2
over Chinese is of great interest. We find that around
50,000 out of 81,000 Japanese tweets are in response to
President Tsai. While Tsai’s dominant presence is largely
expected, we note that Han in comparison has very few
mentions, with no tweets from his account. Tsai also
tweets frequently and intentionally in Japanese, such
that common simplified Chinese users accused her of
being “bought by Japan.”
Since much of the discourse occurs amongst inter-
national users, the sites of democratic harm in this
regard are primarily with self-determination and, to a
lesser extent, accountable representation. This becomes
clearer when we consider the network graph shown
in Figure 2, which portrays the semantic space of our
Twitter data through top hashtags. Here, nodes are
hashtags, and edges are their co-occurrences. The net-
work was produced by tabulating all co-occurrences,
processed in NetworkX, and then plotted with Gephi
(Bastian, Heymann, & Jacomy, 2009; Hagberg, Swart, &
Chult, 2008).
The nodes in purple (center left) show the general
discourse in traditional Chinese. Tsai takes up a large cen-
tral role in setting the agenda. We also note the large
cluster of Japanese responses (in orange) to Tsai. In con-
trast, Han and the Kuomingtang are mentioned much
less (bottom left, in brown). To the left (in dark green),
there is a cluster of hashtags that are supportive of the
DPP and Tsai’s camp, but does not take a central role
in the semantic network. One possibility is these are
pro-DPP campaign users that did not achieve traction.
The tangible imbalance between theDPP and KMT in self-
determination discourse answers RQ2.
The network also provides insight regarding transna-
tional solidarity. We observe a distinct division of lan-
guage in the network structure. The election’s discourse
Table 3. Difference in tweet type distribution between humans and bots (top and bottom 10% by Botscore).
Type of tweet Humans Bots
Retweet without comment 63% (19,143) 69.6% (23,671)
Quoted tweet 15.1% (4,574) 12.5% (4,250)
Reply 10.9% (3,317) 11.7% (3,996)
Original tweet 11% (3,331) 6.2% (2,103)
Table 4. Proportion of simplified vs. traditional Chinese tweets and the location of tweets.
Humans Bots
Language Traditional Chinese 92.6% (4,815) 68.5% (4,378)
Simplified Chinese 7.4% (384) 31.5% (2,013)
Location Local (Taiwan) 21.4% (6,513) 9.5% (3,222)
Non-local 78.6% (23,852) 90.5% (30,798)
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Figure 2. Semantic network of Taiwanese 2020 election Twitter discourse based on hashtags.
in English (green) is much better connected to other
international themes, such as Hong Kong (purple, right),
human rights issues in China (cyan), and by then, men-
tions of the novel coronavirus. The lack of trending hash-
tags in simplified Chinese and keywords indicates that
while Chinese trolls may directly attack Tsai and her
online campaign, their collective behavior on Twitter is
decentralized. This is a shift away fromBradshaw and col-
leagues’ characterization of centralized campaigns, and
consistent with Yang et al.’s (2017) results.
Of note, the red cluster at the top denotes coverage
from Thailand. The relationship between Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Thailand has been under the spotlight during
the Covid-19 pandemic. In April 2020, after a celebrity
drew outrage from Beijing viewers (McDevitt, 2020) and
received large volumes of malicious trolling, users from
Taiwan andHong Kong began defending her online, along
with the Thai users. The hashtag #nnevvy began trending,
and an online community eventually known as the Milk
Tea Alliance with users from Taiwan, Thailand, and Hong
Kong was born. Looking at Thai coverage in the seman-
tic network for Taiwan’s election, the emergence of the
Milk Tea Alliance is not sudden but a large trend of grow-
ing solidarity between the three user bases.
While the literature on transnational solidarity
between Taiwan and Thailand has been sparse, activism
between Hong Kong and Thailand can be traced back to
2016. When students in Thailand invited Hong Kong stu-
dent activist Joshua Wong to share his experiences dur-
ing the Umbrella Movement of 2014, as a speaker for the
1976massacre of Thai student uprisings, hewas detained
at theBangkok airport (Phoborisut, 2019). Protests calling
for his release emerged across Hong Kong and Bangkok,
which produced foundations for solidarity today.
We also note the important role ofApple Daily, a pop-
ular digital native newspaper in Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Their co-occurrence with somany trending hashtags sug-
gests, compared to other newspapers, that they dissem-
inate their articles by carefully tracking the top trend-
ing keywords. In sum, results for Twitter suggest higher
levels of automation, or bot-like behavior, in simplified
Chinese accounts. However, the lack of trending terms
suggests the lack of coordinated attacks, compared to
discourse from Taiwan, largely set by Tsai and the DPP.
4.2. PTT
While Twitter provides insight into discourses of self-
determination on the international front, it lacks details
of public deliberation domestically. To recap, PTT is
widely regarded as the ‘Reddit’ of Taiwan. New events
are often posted here, to the extent that journalists have
used it as a first-line source of information. Although
competing platforms such as DCard have also risen in
popularity in recent years, PTT has been a good repre-
sentative of the local discourse, and its straightforward
interface enables analysis of public discourse.
To get a sense of the discourse on PTT, the top
terms are presented in Table 5, upon removing candi-
date names. We observe words that speak to a demo-
cratic process—freedom, vote, democracy, and govern-
ment. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Hong
Kong are explicitly mentioned. Since this data set is
conditional on being election-related, these keywords
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Table 5. Top words found within the PTT bulletin board.




柯文哲 Ko Wen-Zhe 808
立委 Legislator 700
中央社 Central News Agency 479




中共 Chinese Communist Party 344
主席 Chairman 300
八卦 Gossip 246
高雄市 Kaohsiung City 246
indicate the protests in Hong Kong, and shifting atti-
tudes toward China played a large role in shaping dis-
course of self-determination. Common keywords in the
comments section included the elderly and sugarcane
farmers. Here, the tag ‘sugarcane farmers’ refers to the
rural common folks. We also see PTT specific terms, such
as bucket (水桶). The term ‘cool down in a bucket of cold
water’ emerged as a euphemism for being suspended.
‘Cockroach’ and ‘trash’ are derogatory terms endemic to
PTT’s common vocabulary. Ko Wen-Zhe, the mayor of
Taipei, is the fourth most mentioned term. Two major
Taiwanese cities are mentioned—Taipei and Kaohsiung.
As expected, Taipei is mentioned in conjunction with Ko,
and Kaohsiung with Han.
Keywords only reveal a shallow interplay within
online communication. Next, we consider the comments
section, specifically we quantify the level of disagree-
ment within each post. With P the number of commen-
dations and N the number of dislikes, we define the dis-
agreement score D as follows:
D = N
N + P (1)
The choice of variable reflects negative (N) and posi-
tive (P) reactions. This measure scales with the number
of disagreements (with respect to the initial post), while
also capturing the diversity of commenting participants.
For instance, a score of 0.5 indicates an equal number
of users agreeing and disagreeing. Upon tagging the dis-
agreement scores per article, we consider whether this
is related to the specific discourse topics. We first sub-
set all posts with disagreement scores greater than 0.5.
Figure 3 shows the proportion of articles, subset on a
specific topic. We observe that there is a disproportion-





















Figure 3. Proportion of article topics by the level of disagreement. Note: The figure shows that posts about Tsai and the
DPP yield more disagreement in the discussion sections.
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To understand where these disparities arise, we
cross-section on the geo-local dimension of online
engagementwith certain topics.We leverage the given IP
addresseswithin the comment sections to analyze across
the urban-rural divide and between Taiwanese, Chinese,
and other foreign commenting participants. Figure 4(a)
shows urban and rural user participation on PTT. We
observe that there is little variation across the two
cohorts, with rural users engaging slightlymorewith Han
and China-related discourse.
The discourse across international borders tells a
much more compelling story. Figure 4(b) shows the
topical distribution by Taiwanese, Chinese, and interna-
tional IP addresses. Users with Chinese IPs disproportion-
ately target posts about China, Hong Kong, Tsai, and the
KMT, whereas they engage with Han at a much lower
level. In contrast, there is little to no posting about the
Covid-19 pandemic, relative to the domestic and inter-
national cohort.
Table 6 further shows that posts that involve Chinese
users lead to higher levels of disagreement. This is pro-
nounced in stories about Han,which produces high polar-
ization across Chinese and Taiwanese users. Together,
these answer RQ3 and confirm our H3 in regards to dis-
course about Tsai.
To summarize the results from PTT, we observe that
accountable representation is a likely locus of disinforma-
tion. This also shows that individuals, rather than politi-
cal parties, seem to be the target of choice. The selec-
tive engagement from Chinese citizens in these topics
regarding self-determination—such asHong Kong, China,
and Tsai, while avoiding topics such as Han and Covid-19
shows the phenomenon of emergent coordination.
However, analyses of discourse gives us limited
insight into disinformation directly. Next, we con-
sider Line and the misinformation aggregated under
Cofact’s database.
4.3. Line and Cofacts
The Cofact’s database includes user-forwarded Line
posts and/or links that may contain misinformation.
We similarly tagged the database with discourse topics,
with an additional category for medicine.
The amount of misinformation is high compared to
the number of factual claims. Incumbent President Tsai
seems to attract the highest level of misinformation,
both in proportion and in raw volume. This seems consis-
tent with our observation of PTT and Twitter, where Tsai
































Figure 4. Level of disagreement across different user groups based on IP address: (a) across the urban-rural divide;
(b) between users from Taiwan, China, and other international locations.
Table 6.Mean disagreement ratio between Chinese and Taiwanese IP addresses.
Chinese IPs Taiwanese IPs
All Stories 0.313±0.005 0.272±0.016
Tsai Stories 0.311±0.012 0.303±0.012
Han Stories 0.331±0.034 0.257±0.01
















































Figure 5. Heat map of misinformation classification by topic.
thus completes our addressing of RQ3 and confirmation
of H3.
Interestingly, we observe a low correlation between
the volume of reported cases for the DPP and Tsai.
We offer two potential explanations. In the wake of
Tsai’s perceived failures during themidterm elections, fis-
sures appeared between the DPP and Tsai. Thus, Tsai
became the primary target of hoaxers, rather than the
DPP itself. The decoupling became evident closer to the
election. The second explanation follows a hypothesis
presented earlier, where individuals are the more likely
target of misrepresentation, at least in the case of for-
eign interference.
Finally, we consider the sources of misinformation,
and attempt to answer RQ4 regarding the traditional
media’s role in spreading misinformation. Table 7 shows
the top linked sources within the database and the per-
centage of misinformation.
We have twomain takeaways. First, the primary inter-
platform links are with social media and digital platforms
such as Facebook and YouTube. These two together take
up just over one-third of the reported links. Second, there
is a high proportion of misinformation on dominant dig-
ital news platforms. For instance, hyperlinks for Google
News alone contain almost 50% of all misinformation.
Although it is technically difficult to ascertain the hosting
domains in these cases, other digital news sources score
poorly: United Daily (0.28), KK News (0.33), Apple Daily
(0.28), and ET Today (0.25). Only Liberty Times scores low
on misinformation (0.05). While it’s true there may be
selection bias—these are articles suspected of contain-
ing misinformation after all—the fact that verified news
sources even contain misinformation is particularly con-
cerning. Our findings confirm H4 and observations from
the past (Monaco, 2017), that the traditional media is
often responsible for amplifying misinformation.
Table 7. Top reported misinformation domains and their proportions of misinformation and opinion.
Web domain Links % Opinion % Misinformation
Facebook 58 0.12 0.17
YouTube 55 0.04 0.38
Google 26 0.15 0.46
UDN (United Daily) 25 0.16 0.28
LTN (Liberty Times) 20 0.20 0.05
Kknews 18 0.06 0.33
Appledaily 18 0.06 0.28
Mygopen 18 0.06 0.39
Wikipedia 17 0.00 0.00
Bit 17 0.00 0.53
Line 13 0.15 0.23
Ettoday 12 0.17 0.25
g0v 9 0.00 0.22
Chinatimes 9 0.11 0.33
Twitter 7 0.57 0.14
Social media 133 0.11 0.26
Digital news 128 0.13 0.29
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5. Conclusion
By 8 PM on January 11th, 2020 the results of the
Taiwanese election were clear: Tsai had defended her
presidency and won by the greatest margin in Taiwanese
history. Despite large amounts of disinformation sur-
rounding her candidacy, the outcome of the election
seemed to indicate that was ineffective. An explana-
tion may be dissonance. As Templeman recently postu-
lated, due to the high levels of distrust in Chinese media,
large levels of the population are inoculated against
pro-Chinese sentiment (Templeman, 2020). However,
despite the growing emphasis on domestic issues like
wage growth and LGBT rights, elections never stray far
from the China problem.
We began this study by discussing two gray areas
regarding the frame of light and dark participation.
The first and longer-standing issue is the clash of political
ideologies between China and Taiwan. Second, andmore
importantly, the use of digital tools like bots and group
removal to fight misinformation may limit the domestic
diversity of political voices.
The first goal of this study was to understand the
different facets of the elections communicated, using a
thorough analysis of these three platforms. The second
and more important goal, was to understand what the
discourse and citizen participation say about the tension
of employing digital tools to fight disinformation.
On Twitter, we found Tsai and the DPP’s dominance
in the digital campaign. Her engagement focuses on the
international front, with users from anglophone coun-
tries and Japan. We observe more bot-like behavior
coming from Chinese users and transnational solidarity
between Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Thailand. The high vol-
ume of Tsai’s content suggests counter-discourse against
Chinese trolls is partisan.
On PTT, although Han is themost popular topic of dis-
cussion, it is Tsai and the DPP that elicited the most dis-
agreement. A closer look at the geo-local origins reveals
Chinese participation on issues such as Hong Kong, Tsai,
and the KMT, while avoidance of Han and Covid-19. This
also indicates that discussion surrounding Han arises pre-
dominantly domestically. These results suggest citizen
participation from China focuses on discrediting Tsai and
hence challenges accountable representation. We affirm
this by considering Line. Stories about Tsai are the most
reported stories. Lastly, a concerning level of misinforma-
tion arises from the traditional news media.
The high volume of Tsai-related misinformation,
particularly from Chinese sources, may have justi-
fied the strong terms of the Anti-Infiltration Act.
On December 13, 2019 alone, Facebook removed 118
fan pages, 99 groups, and 51 accounts that supported
Han. One of these pages included 155,443 members.
While some of these may have violated community stan-
dards or had traces of foreign interference, the hard-
line approach certainly silenced legitimate support for
Han. Perhaps Han would have done better had China
not explicitly backed his campaign. Political bots can be
used to promote democratic discourse, to washout for-
eign propaganda, but if themodal actors are political par-
ties, the same technologies can stamp out the diversity
of political opinion. This is especially dangerous in bipar-
tisan situations, as in the case of Taiwan.
Digital tools alone do not determine the dark or light
shade of a campaign; rather, it is whether their use vio-
lates the ideals of deliberative democracies. The case of
Cofacts may provide a solution, in the domain of media
regulation. To avoid partisan censorship of political infor-
mation, crowdsourced solutions promise more equity
and a diversity of voices. However, it is important to
ensure that a representative committee of volunteers is
present in fact-checking.
The case of Taiwan presents comparisons across the
most salient axes in democratic theory: government vs.
citizen-driven solutions, authoritarian control vs. self-
determination. Peter Dalgren, in his canonical work, lays
out four pillars for which civic culture rests upon: knowl-
edge, loyalty to democratic values, practices and rou-
tines, identity as citizens (Dahlgren, 2000). Amidst ris-
ing populism, the ability for citizens to not only par-
ticipate in news making, but to verify fact and build
sociotechnical infrastructure, brings forth an optimism
toward citizen-led democracy and public deliberation.
For Taiwan, it is important to continuously refine its inter-
pretation of free speech, not as a comparison with its
neighbor across the strait, but a set of procedural and
accountable standards.
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